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Abstract
In this paper, we estimate tenure-performance profiles using unique panel data that
contain detailed information on individual workers’ performance. We find that a 10
per cent increase in tenure leads to an increase in performance of 5.5 per cent of
a standard deviation. This translates to an average performance increase of about
75 per cent within the first year of the employment relationship. Furthermore, we
show that there are peer effects in learning on-the-job: Workers placed in teams
with more experienced and thus more productive peers perform significantly better
than those placed in teams with less experienced peers. An increase in the average
team tenure by one standard deviation leads to an increase of 11 to 14 per cent of
a standard deviation in performance.
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1 Introduction
Besides investments in formal training, tenure has shown to be an important determinant
for workers’ productivity as indicated by their wages (Mincer, 1958). The main argument
for wages increasing with tenure is that workers accumulate human capital which is then
rewarded by higher wages. Previous literature on tenure-performance profiles shows that
there are indeed substantial gains from experience (Bishop, 1989; Kostiuk and Follmann,
1989; Shaw and Lazear, 2008). It is, however, not only likely that workers learn from
practising their tasks, but also from observing or imitating peers at work (Barron et al.
1989). When there are possibilities for learning from others, a worker’s output may not
only increase with tenure, but also through being exposed to more experienced peers.
In this paper, we estimate tenure-performance profiles for the first year in a job using
individual performance information of call agents taken from personnel records of a large
call centre, which is part of a multinational telephone company in the Netherlands (see
De Grip and Sauermann, 2012). We find that there is a large marginal return to tenure in
the first months of working for the call centre which decreases substantially after gaining
some experience. This profile closely follows a logarithmic specification. A 10 per cent
increase in tenure is related to an increase of 5.46 per cent of one standard deviation
in performance. For the first 12 months of working in the department analysed, this
amounts to an increase of about 75 per cent in performance. We interpret this increase
in performance as the result of learning on-the-job. When we relate our findings to data
on the number of hours the firm invests in formal training, we find that the number of
hours invested in learning on-the-job is almost twice as large as the investments in formal
training programmes for newly hired agents.
Furthermore, we analyse peer effects in learning, and estimate whether the shape
of the estimated tenure-performance profile depends on the composition of teams. Our
findings show that there are peer effects when agents are working with more experienced
peers in their team. If average peer tenure increases by one standard deviation, agents’
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performance increases by 11 to 14 per cent of a standard deviation in performance. Our
results suggest that in the workplace we analyse learning-by-doing is more important for
learning than learning from others. We show that our results are robust against alternative
hypotheses, especially against the hypothesis of selective labour turnover. Furthermore,
we show that the number of hours worked affects the shape of the estimated tenure-
performance profile; a result which may be explained by ability-sorting. In addition, we
test whether the increase in performance, which is measured as the average length of calls,
comes at the cost of decreases in quality. Although we do not find a negative effect on
direct measures of customer satisfaction, we do find a negative relationship between tenure
and the number of customers calling back within a few days after the call. Overall, it
seems that the increase in quantitative performance outweighs the decrease in the number
of customers calling back.
This study contributes to the literature on estimating the effects of experience on
workers’ productivity. These studies originate from the literature on estimating the effects
of tenure on wages (see Altonji and Williams (2005) for an overview). One of the main
arguments for upward sloping tenure-wage profiles is that it reflects an increasing stock
of human capital which is rewarded by higher wages (Mincer, 1958). It has been shown,
however, that estimating tenure-wage profiles is problematic for a variety of reasons, such
as controlling for trends in wages, sample selection and sample attrition (Altonji and
Williams, 2005). Furthermore, using wages instead of output may underestimate the
actual returns on learning-by-doing (Shaw and Lazear, 2008). One way to overcome these
issues is to use performance data from personnel records. Data taken from personnel
records often contain direct measures of performance and can deal with sample selection
and attrition since the full sample is observed. Carroll et al. (1986) and Kostiuk and
Follmann (1989) use the number of contracts produced by Navy recruiters as a proxy
for performance and find that individual performance substantially increases in the first
months of their employment. Shaw and Lazear (2008) use information about performance
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of windshield installers in a US-American firm to estimate tenure-performance profiles,
and find that output increases by 53 per cent within the first eight months on the job.1
In contrast to these previous studies on the estimation of learning curves, we also
analyse whether working with experienced peers affects learning. Barron et al. (1989)
provide evidence that workers spend a substantial part of learning investments on watching
other workers performing their tasks. Their findings suggest that the working environment
is important for the learning process in the workplace. Destre´ et al. (2008) estimate the
relative importance of self-learning and learning from others using establishment data
from France. They show that workers can learn about 10 per cent of their own stock of
human capital from co-workers. Battu et al. (2003) and Moretti (2004) find evidence
for positive human capital spill-overs within firms and across firms, respectively. Several
studies using information from personnel records find positive externalities either through
social ties (Bandiera et al., 2010) or simply through spatial proximity (Sacerdote, 2001;
Zimmerman, 2003; Falk and Ichino, 2006; Mas and Moretti, 2009). In contrast to these
studies, Guryan et al. (2009) do not find significant peer effects on workers’ performance,
suggesting that peer effects might be related to specific industries, occupational groups
or tasks.
The data used in this study have several key features that allow us to estimate unbi-
ased tenure-performance profiles and the effect of peers on the shape of this profile. First,
we observe all agents working in the call centre over a period of 30 months. All agents
must perform the same tasks irrespective of their tenure, and face the same incentives
set by the call centre’s management. Given the relatively high turnover of agents, this
setting provides substantial variation in tenure and a large number of newly hired agents,
which allows us to estimate tenure-performance profiles across tenure in the first year in
the job. Furthermore, we are able to control for endogenous selection of call agents out
of the call centre.
1There is a related literature analysing learning at the firm level (Benkard, 2000) which distinguishes
between experience effects and spill-over effects in learning within firms (Thornton and Thompson, 2001).
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Second, our data provide very detailed information about individual performance,
observable for each week an agent works. Following other studies using similar data on
call centre agents (e.g. Castilla 2005; Liu and Batt 2007; De Grip and Sauermann 2012),
we use a measure of performance that is based on the average handling time of calls.
This measure has the advantage of being objective, as it is automatically generated and
stored and thus not subject to potentially biased evaluations by supervisors (Flabbi and
Ichino, 2001). Furthermore, it is preferable to wage data because it directly measures
performance, while wages are often fixed under hourly pay (Shaw and Lazear, 2008).
Besides performance information, the data also contain information on investments in
formal training programs. As there are no vocational training programmes for call agents,
we can calculate workers’ total stock of formal training.
Third, the data allow us to analyse peer effects between agents who work in the same
team. Despite a growing interest in the effects of social interaction in the workplace, peer
effects on worker productivity are difficult to identify (Manski, 1993). A few studies use
truly randomised variation in the assignment of workers to peers to identify peer effects
(e.g. De Grip and Sauermann, 2012). A second strand of studies use quasi-exogenous
variation of workers in teams where one would not expect endogenous sorting (e.g. Mas
and Moretti, 2009). In this study, agents who belong to the same team are located next
to each other on the work floor. We exploit the quasi-random variation in assignment to
shifts as well as to teams to identify peer effects on workers’ individual performance.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we describe the setting of this study
and present arguments for both learning-by-doing and learning from others. In Section 3,
we discuss our empirical model and present the estimates of the tenure-performance profile
of call agents and the effects of peers on workers’ tenure-performance profile. Section 4
shows some robustness analyses and Section 5 summarises and concludes.
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2 The firm
2.1 Information on the workplace
To estimate tenure-performance profiles and the impact of peers on the shape of these
profiles, we use panel data of call agents in a call centre. The call centre belongs to
a multinational telecommunications company in the Netherlands, and is segmented in
five departments which are distinguished by the type of customer. In order to analyse a
homogenous production process, we focus our analysis on the largest department which
handles inbound calls of private customers with fixed contracts. In the course of the
observation period, 440 agents worked for this department. All agents have the same
task of handling customer calls in case of questions, complaints or problems. Other
interactions with customers such as written correspondence are dealt with by other back-
office employees.
The data contain objective performance information for each call agent in each week
that the agent is working. The performance measure yit is based on the average handling
time ahtit of agent i in calendar week t. It measures the average time an agent spent
talking to customers and logging the information about the call in the customer database.
This measure has the advantage in that it is automatically generated and is not affected by
potentially subjective performance evaluations by supervisors. In recent studies using data
on call agents, similar outcomes are used to proxy an agent’s productivity (e.g. Castilla,
2005; Liu and Batt, 2007; De Grip and Sauermann, 2012). Furthermore, it is used by call
centre management as the key performance indicator for monitoring performance of agents
in the call centre. The main objective of management is to decrease average handling time
without decreasing the quality provided by the agents. We therefore interpret shorter
calls as beneficial to the firm, and define productivity as yit =
100
ahtit
. Decreasing average
handling time ahtit is thus interpreted as an increase in performance yit.
2
2We deal with potential quality-quantity trade-offs in Section 4.3.
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Agents are organised into 16 teams, each of which is led by a team leader who is
responsible for monitoring and coaching agents. In general, all teams provide all services,
that is, there is no specialisation of teams in handling certain types of calls or serving
certain types of customers. All teams work on the same floor of the building. Work
places are organised into work islands, with up to eight agents of a team sitting next
to each other. Though there is no team work embedded in the production process, the
spatial proximity implies that there is scope for peer effects through learning from peers
by exchanging information.
Although agents’ performance is continuously measured, agents are paid a flat pay
with an adjustment once a year. After a formal evaluation by the team leader after an
annual appraisal interview, agents can receive a wage increase of up to eight per cent.
There are no other explicit incentives.
2.2 Sample selection and descriptive statistics
Our data covers all agents working in the selected department between October 2007
and March 2010. In total, 440 individuals were working for this department for at least
one week in this period. To estimate tenure-performance profiles of agents, however,
we restrict the sample to all employees with less than one year of tenure. There are
several reasons for this restriction. First, focusing on the first year of tenure reduces
the likelihood of biased results due to selection because personnel turnover is relatively
high in call centres in general (Batt et al., 2006). In this call centre, 49 per cent of all
agents observed in our data leave the department within the first year, either to other
departments within the call centre or out of the firm. Because this selection is potentially
non-random, we focus on the first year of tenure to limit the effect of selection on the
estimated tenure-performance profile. The high turnover of call agents also implies that
there are less data to estimate tenure-performance profiles beyond one year of tenure
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(Panel (a) of Figure 1), while there are sufficient data for estimating tenure-performance
profiles among agents in the first year (Panel (b) of Figure 1).3
Second, human capital theory implies that learning effects are highest in the be-
ginning of an agent’s career. Because of faster learning, it is reasonable to expect that
workers’ performance is more likely to be affected by tenure in this period compared to
later periods. This pattern can easily be seen by the solid line depicted in Figure 2 which
shows that the average performance y¯it increases in tenure. After a very steep increase in
the beginning, the marginal returns to tenure decrease. This figure shows that there is
substantial learning in the agents’ task in the first months of the employment relationship,
but much less thereafter.
Column (1) of Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of all agents working in the
call centre department we analyse (N = 440). Thirty-three per cent of the agents in the
sample are men, and their average age is 29 years (Column (1) of Table 1). The average
number of working hours is 21.4 hours per week. These figures are comparable to call
centres in general which are characterised by a predominantly female workforce with a
substantial proportion of part-time workers (Batt et al., 2009).
In Column (2) of Table 1, descriptive statistics of the estimation sample, which
comprises all observations with less than one year of tenure, are shown. Compared to
the full sample of workers (Column (1)), agents with less than one year of tenure have
on average lower performance (0.297 compared to 0.314). Figure 3 shows both the kernel
density of performance for all agents (dashed line) and for agents with a maximum of
one year of tenure (solid line). It illustrates that there is a substantial shift from the
performance of starting agents to the performance of more experienced agents.
To shed more light on non-random selection of agents out of the sample, we focus on
agents which we can observe from their first tenure-week (Column (3) of Table 1). Within
this sample, we can precisely observe when and which agents leave the sample (see Shaw
3To reduce the number of outliers, we also drop all observations that have calls shorter than the first
per centile or longer than the ninety-ninth per centile. In most cases, these extreme average handling
times were caused by a very low number of calls.
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and Lazear, 2008). When comparing the observations of agents leaving the sample within
the observation period (‘leavers’, Column (4)) with those staying in the sample during
that period (‘stayers’, Column (5)), we find that stayers are slightly more productive,
have more tenure, and work substantially more hours than leavers (Column (6)). Though
the group of leavers can comprise positive as well as negative sorting of agents, this result
suggests that agents leaving the department are on average a negative selection.
3 Estimating tenure-performance profiles
3.1 Baseline results
The average tenure-performance profile for agents in their first year of working for the
department is shown in Figure 2. The solid line depicts average performance, controlling
for general time-trends and fluctuations which are measured by week fixed-effects. The
figure shows a steep tenure-performance profile in the first six months of working in the
call centre. After this period, performance is still increasing, but at substantially lower
rates than in the first six months. This result suggests that there is substantial learning
about how to handle customer calls in the first months of the employment relationship
but not thereafter.
In order to estimate the agents’ tenure-performance profile, we model the effect of
tenure dit on performance yit as a linear-log function. The linear-log prediction, which
is depicted by the dashed line in Figure 2, provides the best approximation of the non-
parametrically estimated tenure-performance profile compared to other functional forms.
Our regression model can thus be written as:
yit =α + log(dit)
′β1 +X ′itβ2 + γt + uit (1)
where the unit of observation is agent i in calendar week t. The slope of the tenure-
performance profile is thus estimated by β1. The vector Xit indicates whether the agent
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had a previous employment relationship with the same call centre, the number of working
hours in week t, as well as the agent’s gender. Average performance fluctuates substan-
tially around its mean, due to such issues as technical network problems, problems with
the internal IT-system, or changes in the composition of types of calls. To control for
these aggregate shocks, we add week fixed-effects γt to Equation (1). The effect of tenure
on performance can be identified from general time trends because the timing of entry
dates varies across all agents. The idiosyncratic error term uit is clustered to allow for
within-agent correlation.
In general, it is possible to estimate Equation (1) including individual fixed-effects
(see Shaw and Lazear 2008). Because tenure and time are perfectly collinear, however,
the effect of tenure cannot be identified unless making ad-hoc assumptions such as the
equality of two specific fixed effects.4 Equation (1) is therefore estimated using pooled
ordinary least squares.
The main regression results are shown in Table 2. Despite piecewise adding control
variables Xit and week fixed-effects to the regression, the estimated effect of tenure on
performance (β̂1) is hardly affected and stays at about 0.045. Our preferred specification,
which is shown in Column (5), includes the full set of covariates. The results show that,
over the first year working for the call centre, an increase of 10 per cent in tenure is related
to an increase in performance yit of 0.00442. Given a standard deviation of performance
of 0.081, this relates to an increase of 5.5 per cent of a standard deviation in performance.
To control for agent-specific characteristics, we included a set of control variables.
First, to control for previous employment spells as a call agent, we use a dummy variable
Previous Employment which is defined as being one (1) if the agent had a employment
relationship with the same call centre before the current employment relationship. Among
agents in our estimation sample, 4.5 per cent had previous employment relationships with
this call centre (Column (2) of Table 1). Agents who had an employment relationship
4In order to assess the impact of individual fixed effects on the estimated tenure-performance profile,
we also estimated Equation (1) with and without individual fixed effects, both without week fixed effects.
The results show that there is no statistical difference between the effect of the tenure variable of the two
models. The results are available upon request from the authors.
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with the call centre prior to the current employment relationship perform 0.0399 (i.e.
49.3 per cent of one standard deviation in performance yit) better than agents without
previous employment. This suggests that agents who previously worked in this centre
have accumulated skills which enable them to work at a faster pace, compared to new
hires without previous employment in the call centre.
Second, we include the number of weekly working hours in order to control for the
amount of time an agent spends on learning-by-doing. Third, we control for an agent’s
gender. Both variables, however, do not have a significant effect on the shape of the
estimated tenure-performance profile.
3.2 Investments in learning on-the-job
Our interpretation of the shape of the tenure-performance profile is that increases in
performance reflect an agent’s stock of skills. The shape can thus be used to estimate
the size of the firm’s implicit investment in learning on-the-job, G. Given supply of
experienced workers, the firm could either appoint an experienced agent for a vacant
position, or can hire an inexperienced agent with zero tenure to fill the vacancy. The
implicit investment comes from the fact that inexperienced agents are learning and thus
perform worse than experienced agents in the first months of employment. We therefore
assume that an inexperienced agent starts with performance yd=1,it in the first working
week d = 1 and then follows the tenure-performance profile estimated by Equation (1)
until the agent can work at the performance level of an experienced agent in (tenure)
week d = K, yd=K,it.
After calculating the difference between the two agents yd=K−yk ∀ k = 1, . . . ,K−1,
we transform this number to the difference in average handling time, and multiply it by
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the average number of calls an experienced agent handles in one week, ck,it. We interpret
the difference, G,
G =
K∑
k=1
(
100
yd=K − yk
)
· ck,it (2)
as the learning investment of untrained workers. When estimating G for an average
agent, we find that 161.7 hours of learning are required before a new hire has the same
productivity as an experience agent. All other things equal, the firm has to invest this
amount of ‘learning on-the-job’, minus the wage difference between the two agents. In
fact, these opportunity costs of hiring an inexperienced worker are about twice as high as
the call centre’s investment in hours of formal training, which accumulates to 84.1 hours
of formal training programs in the first year.
3.3 Team composition and tenure-performance profiles
The actual task of agents, handling customer calls, is an individual production process.5
Despite the fact that there is no joint team work, peer effects are plausible in our context,
because agents do the same task regardless of their tenure, and teams are located next
to each other at the workplace. Peer effects are more likely between agents of the same
team, compared to peer effects between agents of different teams, because agents of one
team sit next to each other, while agents of other teams have a larger spatial distance
at the work floor. Moreover, agents who belong to the same team may exchange work-
related information and knowledge during team meetings.6 In addition, agents with higher
tenure probably have more skills to handle calls, retrieve information from the customer
5This does not preclude that there are externalities from an individual worker’s production to the
worker’s peers. In the present setting, providing low quality can lead to customers calling back. These
repeat calls may have to be treated more carefully. We argue, however, that this does not affect our
estimate. First, agents are monitored thoroughly by their team leaders who can listen in on calls.
Second, since calls are randomly assigned to agents in the call centre, all agents have the same probability
of receiving calls from customers calling back.
6This argument does not preclude that peer effects also arise between agents of different teams. If
there are also between-team peer effects, our estimated within-team peer effect can be interpreted as a
lower bound of the true peer effect.
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to deal with the customer’s problem efficiently, and to use the computer software system,
compared to new hires. This argument is supported by the outcomes of the analysis in
Section 3.1, which shows a steep tenure-performance profile over the first year of tenure.
We use three different variables to capture the effect of peers on a worker’s own
performance. The first two variables used to proxy peer effects are average performance
of peers in an agent’s team, and the peers’ average tenure. We use both variables lagged
by one period, i.e., one working week. The reasoning for using lagged values instead of
contemporaneous values is twofold. First, one argument for peer effects is that workers
learn from their peers. It is more likely that peer performance and peer tenure do not have
an immediate effect but should rather pay off after having learned from peers. Second,
using lagged peer performance avoids the problem of simultaneous determination of both
outcome yit (agent’s performance) and peers’ performance, for instance due to common
shocks to performance.
The third variable used to proxy peer effects is the average peer experience, cumu-
lated over an agent’s tenure, and normalised by the agent’s tenure. The reasoning for
this variable is that we want to measure the cumulative effect of being exposed to more
experienced agents; the variable therefore measures the cumulative exposure to tenure.
To be able to compare the effects of the three peer variables, all are standardised with
a zero mean and a standard deviation of one. Descriptive statistics of the peer variables
are shown in Table 3.
The effect of the peer variables on workers’ performance is estimated in three separate
regressions by augmenting Equation (1) by the variable dit which captures information
on peers:
yit =α + log(dit)
′β1 +X ′itβ2 + γt + d
′
itθ + uit (3)
We estimate the effect of the three distinct definitions of the variable dit separately. Each
of the peer variables is calculated as the average for agent i in the previous week t − 1.
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All peer variables take into account that an agent is exposed to another agent who works
the same hours because the peer variables are weighted by the number of joint working
hours of agent i with the worker’s peers’ working hours in the same week.
Because information on when an agent enters and leaves the call centre is available
for a shorter time period only, the number of observations drops from 7,623 (356 agents)
to 3,430 (237 agents). For this reason, Column (1) of Table 4 first shows the estimation
results of Equation (1) with the sample used to estimate peer effects. The estimated
effect of log-tenure on the measure of performance, yit (0.048) does not significantly differ
from the previous estimate (Column (5) of Table 2). The other columns of Table 4
shows the estimation results of Equation 3. Columns (2) and (3) show the effect of
peer performance and peer tenure on a worker’s own performance, whereas Column (4)
shows the effect of cumulated peer experience. All three variables significantly affect
workers’ own performance, with the main effect of tenure not significantly changing from
the baseline model (Column (1)). When including the average performance of agents
who were working with the agent in the previous week (Average team performance t− 1),
log-tenure has an effect of 0.049 (Column (2)). An increase of one standard deviation in
average team performance in the previous week (t−1), is related to an increase in workers’
own performance of 0.0097. This is the equivalent to 11 per cent of one standard deviation
in the outcome variable yit. The use of peer performance may, however, raise concerns,
because it may be driven by simultaneous determination of both workers’ own performance
yit and peer performance dit. We therefore estimate Equation (3) with lagged average
team tenure as the proxy for peer effects (Column (3) of Table 4), and find a significant
coefficient of 0.109. This translates to an effect of 13.5 per cent of a standard deviation in
yit when increasing average tenure of a worker’s team mates by one standard deviation.
As a third proxy for peer effects, we use cumulative average team tenure, divided by the
number of weeks an agent has worked in the call centre. The estimated coefficient is
significant, and relates to an increase in yit of 10.9 per cent of a standard deviation in
performance when the cumulative team mates’ tenure increases by one standard deviation.
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Independent of the specification of the peer variable, the results presented in Table
4 show that having worked with better performing or more experienced peers improves
a worker’s performance. One standard deviation increase in the average performance or
the average tenure of a worker’s peers leads to an increase in the agent’s performance
between 11 and 13.5 per cent of a standard deviation. These results show that it may be
beneficial to the firm to place new agents in more experienced teams. When calculating
G as in Equation (2) based on the sample used in Table 4, the learning investment
accumulates to 164 hours over the first year of tenure. When including average peer
tenure as an additional control variable, this number reduces to 157 hours. If we interpret
the difference between the two estimates as the size of overestimation when not correcting
for peer effects, the investments G which are due to learning-by-doing are overestimated
by 4.3 per cent.
4 Robustness analyses
4.1 Turnover and selection of workers
Call centres face relatively high turnover of workers compared to other sectors of industries
(Batt et al., 2006). If turnover is related to individual performance or to unobserved
factors that affect both tenure and performance of the individual worker, the shape of
the estimated tenure-performance profile is likely to be affected by workers who quit the
firm. Therefore, the observed increase in performance by tenure is partly the result of an
improved match quality instead of learning on-the-job.
The sample used in this study allows us to compare different types of agents. We can
distinguish between agents leaving the department analysed in this study (leavers) and
agents who are not leaving (stayers).7 However, since we do not observe agents who left
the department before our observation period started, this analysis is likely to be affected
7We do not have information on the exact date when agents leave the department. We define agents
as leavers when they have not worked in the department for 20 or more weeks in a row.
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by left-censoring (Shaw and Lazear 2008). We therefore limit the sample to new hires,
i.e. agents that we observe from their first working week.
Column (1) of Table 5 shows the results when estimating Equation (1) for new hires
only. This sample contains 303 agents, of which 96 are stayers; the remaining 207 agents
leave within the observation period. The estimated coefficient for log(tenure) is very
similar to the baseline estimates (Column (5) of Table 2). An increase of tenure by 10
per cent leads to an increase of of 5.5 per cent of a standard deviation of performance
(estimated coefficient of 0.0444). The estimated effect of log(tenure) on performance for
stayers (0.0516) corresponds to an increase in performance of 6.4 per cent of one standard
deviation when tenure increases by 10 per cent. For agents leaving the department,
however, the corresponding effect is only 4.8 per cent (0.0385), which is significantly
lower than the estimated performance increase for agents who remain employed in the
call centre.
These estimation results have two implications. First, the data shows that a substan-
tial share of agents who are observed from their first working week leave the department
within our observation period (68 per cent). Second, these agents have significantly lower
tenure-performance profiles. This endogenous sorting of agents can be interpreted as a
positive selection of agents who stay employed in the department, while the leaving agents
comprise a negative selection of workers.8
4.2 Assignment to teams and shifts
To identify the causal peer effect on workers’ performance development, either truly ran-
dom assignment by means of experiments (e.g. De Grip and Sauermann, 2012) or quasi-
random assignment to groups (e.g. Mas and Moretti, 2009) is required. In this study, the
effect of an agent’s peers on own performance is identified by quasi-random changes in
8The difference between the estimated tenure-performance profile of leavers and stayers can be affected
by the tenure-segment one observes. When estimating the same regressions for agents with a maximum
tenure of 3 months, the estimated tenure-performance profiles are not significantly different from one
another. When increasing the tenure-segment, this difference becomes significant.
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team composition. Although each agent is assigned to one team supervised by one team
leader, there are week-to-week differences in whether an agent is working at all, and in the
number of hours an agent is working. Therefore, the agent’s composition of team mates
differs from week to week.
In order to support the hypothesis of random assignment of agents to teams, we test
whether the assignment to teams is selective with respect to ability. We therefore regress
a measure of individual ability on the average ability of the team. We generate a measure
of ability by using the estimated individual fixed-effects from a regression of performance
yit on a full set of tenure and individual fixed-effects (cf. Mas and Moretti, 2009).
yit = ηi + γd + εit (4)
This measure of ability, ηˆi, is then regressed on the average ability of the other workers
in the team (Sacerdote 2001). Because we are interested in the team coaches’ influence
on the selection of new agents, we run this test for agents switching to new team coaches.
The explanatory variable, average peer ability yij, is thus taken from the agents in the
team j to which an agents is switching. Table 6 shows the estimation results of individual
ability on average ability in the destination team using agent-week observations after an
agent switched to a new team. The results show that average team ability does not
have a significant effect on individual ability. This allows us to conclude that there is no
ability-based selection for agents when switching team leaders.9
Further, it is rather difficult for agents to select themselves into the same hours as
particular peers. Agents must be available for scheduling during the opening hours of
the call centre, and must state their preferences for particular hours four weeks prior.
Based on both their preferences and the expected demand by customers, managers assign
agents to particular hours. As a result, both the composition of agents at each point in
time and weekly team composition changes frequently. As the scheduling is done for the
9New agents are recruited by a temporary help agency that selects potential agents who fulfill the
job description. The team leader usually does not have any influence on the selection of newly recruited
agents and their placement into teams.
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whole department and not for individual teams, it is unlikely that there is any strategic
planning within teams. Therefore, there is no reason to expect that spurious correlation
drives our estimation results of the peer effects.
4.3 Substitution between quality and quantity of calls
The performance variable used in this study, average handling time, is a measure of
quantitative performance. Following De Grip and Sauermann (2012), we use additional
information to estimate the effect on quality of calls. We employ two types of measures
to capture quality of agents’ calls. The first measure is based on the share of repeat calls.
The share of repeat calls is defined as the share of customers to whom an agent spoke who
called the call centre again within seven days. This measure is used by management to
evaluate the quality of calls, as customers may call again, potentially because the problem
is not solved. Low values of repeat calls (rcit) are interpreted as high performance. We
therefore define call quality as yqit =
1
rcit∗10 , with an average of 0.507 (see Table 3). Figure
4 shows the corresponding non-parametrically estimated tenure-performance profile for
this measure of call quality. Call quality appears to decrease in the first 3 months and to
flatten thereafter. The estimation results show that with increasing tenure, call quality
significantly decreases (-0.0193; Table 7, Column (1)). An increase in tenure by 10 per
cent is thus related to a decrease of call quality by 1.1 per cent of one standard deviation
in the quality measure. This suggests that despite the fact that quantity is improving
substantially over the course of the first months, this partly comes at the cost of lower
call quality.
Having information on both average handling time and call quality also allows us
to create a composite measure of productivity that contains both dimensions. We thus
define y′it as y
′
it = yit ∗ (1 − rcit). For this measure, larger shares of repeat calls rcit are
interpreted as a penalty in performance, since each additional percentage point in the
share of repeat calls (lower quality) relates to a lower composite productivity y′it. The
results, shown in Column (2) of Table 7, indicate that there is a positive effect of tenure
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on the overall measure. The estimated coefficient of 0.0332 is significantly different from
zero. A 10 per cent increase in tenure thus leads to an increase in overall productivity
of 4.5 per cent of a standard deviation. This suggests that the positive quantity effect
outweighs the negative quality effect.
Second, we use information from a customer satisfaction survey as an alternative
measure of call quality. This survey is conducted monthly in order to monitor the quality
provided by the departments on an aggregate level. Among all incoming calls, customers
are selected and called for a short survey. Though there are only about 200 calls evaluated
in this way each month, the sample consists of a randomly chosen subset of calls. The
survey contains three outcomes related to the agent’s quality. Customers were asked to
grade the ‘knowledge of agent’ (Grade 1), whether the ‘agent understood question’ (Grade
2), and whether the agent had a ‘solution to the problem’ (Grade 3) on a scale from 1
(very bad) to 10 (very good).
Columns (3) through (5) of Table 7 show that, controlling for an agent’s previous
employment, the number of working hours, the gender, and week fixed-effects, there is no
significant relationship between agent’s tenure and service quality. Neither the knowledge
of the agent, nor whether the agent understood the question or had a solution to the
customer’s problem appears to be related to tenure.
Overall, these results suggest that the more efficient calls of agents with longer tenure
come at the costs of a lower call quality as proxied by repeat calls. Overall, however, our
results suggest that performance increases with tenure.
4.4 Working hours and the shape of tenure-performance profiles
In the call centre we analyse, there is substantial within- and between-worker heterogeneity
in working hours. If learning on-the-job is related to the actual number of hours worked,
this heterogeneity may lead to differences in the shape of estimated tenure-performance
profiles, depending on the number of working hours.
18
In order to assess this possible bias, we generate two alternative measures of tenure:
tenure measured in working weeks (as opposed to calendar weeks) and tenure measured
in full-time equivalents (fte). Tenure in working weeks is defined as the number of weeks
an agent worked in the past apart from holiday weeks and other non-working weeks.
The second measure, tenure in fte, is defined as the cumulated number of hours worked,
divided by 38. It thus measures the number of fte weeks the agent has been working for
the call centre. In order to make the variables comparable to the original tenure variable,
both variables are rescaled to years. As it is important to have the full history of the
actual working hours of agents for this analysis, we only use new hires.
Table 8 shows the estimation results of regressions of log-performance on the three
different tenure definitions. Column (1) shows the estimation results of our baseline with
this smaller sample. The baseline estimate using the standard definition of tenure is
0.0444, compared to 0.0442 using the full sample (Column (5) of Table 2). The perfor-
mance effect of tenure in working weeks in Column (2) is slightly higher (1.58 per cent)
than in the analysis with the standard measure of tenure. Since the difference between the
two estimates refers to non-working weeks, the result suggests that the tenure-performance
profile is actually slightly steeper, than if the non-working weeks are neglected. When
using the third definition of tenure, tenure in fte weeks, the effect of tenure appears to
be significantly lower than the effect of tenure measured in working weeks. This suggests
that agents with more working hours have a tenure-performance profile that is less steep
than the tenure-performance profile of workers who work less hours. This result may be
explained by sorting high-ability individuals (e.g., students in higher education who work
for a shorter time in the call centre) into contracts with shorter working hours.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we analysed tenure-performance profiles of call centre agents, using unique
panel data of a multinational telecommunication firm’s call centre that contain detailed
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performance information on the individual level. The results show that call agents have a
very steep tenure-performance profile in the beginning of their job in the call centre. This
increase, however, flattens considerably after about 6 months. The tenure-performance
profile can very well be described by a logarithmic function. An increase of tenure by 10
per cent leads to an increase of 5.5 per cent of one standard deviation in performance.
We interpret this increase in performance as learning due to accumulation of human
capital. For call agents working for this call centre, the estimated shape of the tenure-
performance profile makes sense. The agents’ task itself —answering customer calls—
is repetitive. The highest returns to learning should therefore occur in the beginning
of the employment relationship. In our data, agents perform 66.5 per cent better after
8 months which is comparable to related findings from other sectors. After this initial
period, the marginal return to tenure decreases. The rather fast learning of agents may
be due to the relatively low complexity of the job. In other, more complex jobs, tenure-
performance profiles may be less steep. The initially lower pay-off of learning on-the-job
can be recouped over longer job spells. These results imply that the firm’s investment
in learning on-the-job is substantial. The agents’ increase in performance translates to
a learning investment by the firm of about 162 hours. Over the same period, the firm’s
investments in formal training are much lower and accumulate to an average of 84 hours.
In addition, we show that workers significantly benefit from working with more
experienced peers. We find that an increase in the average team tenure of one standard
deviation relates to an increase in performance of 14 per cent of one standard deviation.
This shows that it can be beneficial for firms to place new workers in teams with more
experienced agents and thereby facilitating knowledge spill-overs between workers even if
the workers are not involved in team work.
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A Figures
Figure 1: Kernel density plot for tenure
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Note: Panel (a) shows the the density plot for all agents, (b) shows the density plot for all agents with a maximum of one
year of tenure. Tenure is measured in years and averaged for each agent in the sample.
Figure 2: Non-parametric and logarithmic tenure-performance profiles
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Note: the solid line shows the predicted performance after a regression of performance yit on tenure fixed-effects and week
fixed effects. The capped spikes show the appropriate 95 per cent confidence interval. The dashed line shows the predicted
performance after a regression of yit on log(tenure).
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Figure 3: Kernel density plot for performance
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Note: The figure shows the kernel density for performance yit for all agents with a maximum of one year of tenure (solid
line) and for all agents with more than one year of tenure (dashed line). Performance is measured in years and averaged
for each agent in the sample
Figure 4: Non-parametric tenure-quality profile
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Note: the solid line shows the predicted qualitative performance measure after a regression of performance ycit on tenure
fixed-effects and week fixed effects. The capped spikes show the appropriate 95 per cent confidence interval.
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B Tables
Table 1: Descriptive statistics (main variables)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Tenure restriction No Up to 1 year of tenure
Sample restriction All All agents New hires New hires New hires
agents All Leavers Stayers Diff. (5)-(4)
Performance (yit) 0.314 0.297 0.283 0.279 0.292 0.016*
(0.088) (0.081) (0.072) (0.070) (0.075)
Tenure 1.360 0.297 0.227 0.221 0.241 0.072**
(in years) (2.606) (0.232) (0.153) (0.152) (0.155)
Previous employment 0.112 0.045 0.013 0.005 0.031 0.026*
(0.316) (0.207) (0.114) (0.070) (0.175)
Working hours 21.433 23.119 23.647 21.189 28.945 7.784***
(7.489) (7.121) (7.298) (5.549) (7.812)
Gender (1=male) 0.328 0.351 0.356 0.348 0.375 0.027
(0.470) (0.478) (0.480) (0.477) (0.487)
Age 29.331 27.011 26.173 26.506 25.525 -0.981
(10.105) (8.192) (7.846) (7.496) (8.492)
Number of agents 440 356 303 207 96
Number of observations 15011 7623 6451 4274 2177
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Descriptive statistics are based on the average for each individual
agent. Standard deviations in parenthesis.
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Table 2: The Effect of Tenure on Performance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(tenure) .0457*** .0448*** .0446*** .0448*** .0442***
(.0024) (.0025) (.0024) (.0024) (.0026)
Previous employment .0415*** .0399*** .0411*** .0399***
(.0134) (.0137) (.0138) (.0138)
Working hours -.0003 -.0003 .0001
(.0003) (.0003) (.0003)
Gender (1=male) .0109 .0111
(.0089) (.0088)
Constant .3799*** .3761*** .3830*** .3795*** .3690***
(.0066) (.0069) (.0108) (.0109) (.0116)
Week fixed-effects No No No No Yes
Observations 7623 7623 7623 7623 7623
Number of agents 356 356 356 356 356
R2 .2124 .2224 .2234 .2261 .2918
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Dependent variable: yit. All regressions are estimated using
observations with a maximum of one year of tenure. Standard errors are clustered at the agent level.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics (other variables)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
mean SD Observations Agents
Average team performance t− 1 -0.207 0.857 3194 227
Average team tenure t− 1 -0.379 0.901 3155 227
Average peer experience / tenure -0.502 0.893 3430 237
Permanent productivitya 0.192 0.064 345 171
Call quality (yqit) 0.507 0.178 7489 355
Composite productivity (y′it) 0.249 0.074 7489 355
Grade 1 6.876 2.232 841 112
Grade 2 6.404 2.294 850 112
Grade 3 6.034 2.734 776 105
Tenure in working weeks (in years) 0.183 0.145 6451 303
Tenure in fte weeks (in years) 0.317 0.239 6451 303
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Descriptive statistics are based on the average for each individual
agent. Agents with one year of tenure at most are considered. Standard deviations in parenthesis.
Permanent productivity is calculated from fixed effects θi which are obtained from a regression of average
handling time (yit) on individual fixed effects, and a full set of dummies for each level of tenure d (see
Equation 4). For the calculation of the variable composite productivity, see Section 4.3. Grades are given
on ‘knowledge of agent’ (grade 1), ‘agent understood question’ (grade 2), ‘solution of the problem’ (grade
3). Grades are given on a scale from 1 (very bad) to 10 (very good). Tenure in working weeks is defined
as the number of working weeks an agent worked. Tenure in fte weeks is defined as the number of fte
working weeks an agent worked.
a based on the full data.
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Table 4: The effect of peers’ experience on individual performance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(tenure) .0476*** .0487*** .0469*** .0449***
(.0028) (.0037) (.0041) (.0033)
Average team performance t− 1 (std.) .0097**
(.0039)
Average team tenure t− 1 (std.) .0109***
(.0040)
Average peer experience / tenure (std.) .0088*
(.0053)
Constant .3625*** .3613*** .3605*** .3604***
(.0170) (.0173) (.0180) (.0170)
Week fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3430 3194 3155 3430
Number of agents 237 227 227 237
R2 .3945 .3734 .3767 .3991
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Dependent variable: yit. Average team performance is defined as
the performance average of peers within the team. Average team tenure is defined accordingly. Average
peer experience is calculated as the sum over average team tenure in the past, normalised by the number
of periods an agent has been working. All peer variables are weighted by joint hours between agent i
and other agents j and standardised with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. All regressions
are estimated using observations with a maximum of one year of tenure. Control variables are previous
employment, working hours, and gender. Standard errors are clustered at the agent level.
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Table 5: The effects of tenure on new hires
All Stayers Leavers
(1) (2) (3)
log(tenure) .0444*** .0516*** .0385***
(.0027) (.0040) (.0034)
Working hours .0002 -.0001 .0005
(.0004) (.0005) (.0004)
Gender (1=male) .0015 .0013 .0031
(.0085) (.0121) (.0106)
Constant .3685*** .4000*** .3468***
(.0125) (.0205) (.0141)
Week fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6451 2177 4274
Number of agents 303 96 207
R2 .2916 .3967 .2610
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Dependent variable: yit. All regressions are estimated using
observations with a maximum of one year of tenure. Furthermore, only new hires are included. New
hires are defined as agents who are observed from their first working week. Leavers (stayers) are defined
as agents who do (not) drop out within our observation period. Standard errors are clustered at the
agent level. Previous experience is included from these regressions because of missing variation in one of
the regressions.
Table 6: Selection into teams
(1)
Average Permanent Productivity -.2922
(.1836)
Constant .2504***
(.0365)
Observations 343
Number of agents 170
R2 0.005
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable: permanent
productivity of agent i when switching from team j to team k, yij . Average permanent productivity is
the mean of permanent productivity of all agents in destination team k to which an agent is switching
to, yik (excluding the agent’s own permanent productivity). Permanent productivity is calculated from
fixed effects θij which are obtained from a regression of average handling time (yit) on individual fixed
effects, and a full set of dummies for each level of tenure d (see Equation 4).
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Table 7: The effect of tenure on quality
Outcome log(yqit) log(y
′
it) Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3
(1) (2) (3) (5) (5)
log(tenure) -.0193*** .0332*** .0046 -.0659 .0236
(.0031) (.0020) (.1473) (.1420) (.2035)
Previous employment -.0325*** .0326*** .3549 .3817 .5665
(.0125) (.0106) (.3977) (.2570) (.4293)
Working hours -.0013*** .0001 -.0081 -.0020 -.0021
(.0004) (.0002) (.0127) (.0107) (.0135)
Gender (1=male) .0027 .0074 .2920 .2629 .2355
(.0084) (.0067) (.1874) (.1865) (.2642)
Week fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7133 7133 736 745 674
Number of agents 330 330 103 103 96
R2 .2765 .2882 .0507 .1068 .0507
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All standard errors are clustered at the agent level. Call quality yqit is measured as
1/(share of repeat calls*10). The composite productivity measure y′it is defined as y
′
it = ahtit ∗ (1− share of repeat calls).
Grades are given on ‘knowledge of agent’ (Grade 1 ), ‘agent understood question’ (Grade 2 ), and ‘solution of the problem’
(Grade 3 ). Grades are given on a scale of 1 (very bad) to 10 (very good).
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Table 8: Determinants of performance using different tenure definitions
(1) (2) (3)
log(tenure in calendar weeks) .0444***
(.0026)
log(tenure in working weeks) .0459***
(.0026)
log(tenure in fte weeks) .0409***
(.0025)
Previous employment .0573* .0496 .0491
(.0315) (.0350) (.0340)
Working hours .0002 .0001 -.0008**
(.0004) (.0004) (.0004)
Gender (1=male) .0017 .0013 .0016
(.0085) (.0084) (.0084)
Constant .3677*** .3745*** .4140***
(.0125) (.0124) (.0131)
Week fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6451 6451 6451
Number of agents 303 303 303
R2 .2953 .3043 .2933
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Dependent variable: yit. All standard errors are clustered at
the agent level. All regressions are estimated using observations with a maximum of one year of tenure.
‘Tenure in working weeks’ is defined as the number of working weeks an agent worked. ‘Tenure in fte
weeks’ is defined as the number of fte weeks an agent worked. All regressions include new hires only
which are defined as agents who can be observed from their first working week.
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